India’s Policy toward Afghanistan: Implications to the Regional Security Governance

WANG Jin

(School of Political Science, University of Haifa, Israel)

Abstract: As a major player in South Asia, India’s priority in Afghanistan is to support the Afghan government established after 2001. However, the political and security challenges after the announcement of US military withdrawal from Afghanistan have significantly impacted India. Afghanistan is facing a dual challenge on both security and political levels. On the security level, although the counter-insurgency measures taken by both international forces led by the US and Afghan forces have lasted for more than a decade, Taliban and other Islamic extremist groups continue to exert their strong political and security influence all across Afghanistan. At the political level, the new unity government, formed by Dr. President Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah, Chief executive Officer, after the two terms of the presidency of Hamid Karzai, shows possible divisions and uncertainty. To address the new challenges, on the one hand, India tries to continue its “soft measures” to safeguard its interests in Afghanistan, while on the other hand, India strengthens the cooperation with international organizations and other regional states to create positive conditions for Afghan stability and reconstruction. However, given the political uncertainty and worsening security surroundings in Afghanistan, India still faces several challenges.

Key Words: India; Afghanistan; Taliban; United States and South Asia

Historically, India has had close relations with Afghanistan. Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh once stated: “Our cooperation with Afghanistan is an open book. We have civilization links, and we are both here to stay.” The ancient Indian Mauryan Empire, which included part of today’s Afghanistan, influenced northern India, Central Asia and even western China with its unique “Gandharan art”. Many Buddhists, harboring the mission of expanding Buddhism, travelled from India to Central Asia and China via Afghanistan. Geopolitically, Afghanistan is vital for India’s security and survival. The Mughal Empire, which ruled India for centuries and originated from Afghanistan, was threatened by Afghanistan for quite a long time until Emperor Akbar, who suppressed the forces of local tribes and clans in Afghanistan in the late 16th century. The British Empire also tried to make Afghanistan the buffer zone against the Russian Empire due to India’s vulnerability to invasion from Afghanistan.

   Aiming at suppressing the small-scale revolts in western Afghanistan provoked by the reforms of pro -Soviet and Communist government, and preventing both the Islamic expansion from newly established Islamic Iran and the Afghan government from possible diplomatic turn to US, the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan in 1979 did not produce peace and stability, but rather broke the political balance both inside and outside Afghanistan. The political disorder, especially the Taliban’s dominance in Afghanistan, hampered India’s engagement with Afghanistan. India did not recognize the legitimacy of Taliban government and viewed it as a vital threat to Indian internal security. When the international forces led by the US toppled the Taliban regime in 2001, the new political situation in Afghanistan provided valuable opportunities for India-Afghanistan relations.

I. India-Afghan Ties after 2001

India’s relations with Afghanistan have improved significantly since the Taliban regime was toppled by international forces led by the US in 2001. The India-Afghanistan relation is not hindered by territorial disputes or border ambiguity. Meanwhile, India’s long-term support for the “Northern Alliance”, the Afghan opposition forces against the Taliban in the 1990s, helped India with favorable political positions in the foreign policy of the new Afghan government, as the key Afghan government posts were controlled by Northern Alliance senior members after 2001. It is against this backdrop that, as many argue, New Delhi decided to pursue a “soft power” strategy, that is, sticking to civilian rather than military matters, toward Afghanistan. To satisfy the security, economic and geopolitical concerns, India has taken several measures to safeguard its interests in Afghanistan.

First, India assists Afghanistan in the state-building process. Diplomatically, India actively improves its relationship with Afghanistan. India was one of the major states that recognized the newly established Afghan government. India updated its diplomatic presence in Afghanistan from chargé d’affaires to ambassador plenipotentiary in October 2011, and reopened its embassy in Kabul in 2002. India and Afghanistan furthered their bilateral relationship in 2002 through signing the Strategic Partnership Agreement, which made India the first “strategic partner” of Afghanistan. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s official visit to Afghanistan in 2006 was the first of an Indian prime minister since 1970. India also actively assisted Afghanistan in political establishment. For example, with its political experience, India not only helped train Afghan staff in electoral processes, but it also provided electronic voting machines to facilitate the election. India and Afghanistan also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation of Local Governance in 2008 to train Afghan local government officials.

Second, India also focuses on the area of development and economic reconstruction in Afghanistan. India has made substantial efforts in the recovery of Afghanistan’s economy. It believes that economic development is vital for the stability and peace in Afghanistan. On the one hand, India has provided Afghanistan with large amounts of humanitarian assistance and loans for the construction of projects like power generation plants and roads. India is Afghanistan’s largest donor (behind the US, Japan, UK and Germany), having provided Afghanistan with nearly $2 billion aid from 2001 to 2014. India helped Afghanistan build the Zaranj-Delaram Road, Salma Dam Power Project and Pul -e Khumri Transmission Line. Many hospitals and schools in Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Heart and Mazar-e-Sharif are also aided or funded by Indian companies and government. For example, the Afghan National Agricultural Sciences and Technology University in Kandahar was constructed and funded by India.

After more than three decades of turmoil and unrest that have significantly impeded the development of Afghan society, the Afghan economy has made substantial progress since 2003 with the average growth rate of more than 9%. The GDP growth of Afghanistan not only generates employment opportunities that help stabilize Afghan society, but also helps diversify the Afghan economic ties with the world. India is interested in widening its business in Afghanistan, particularly in the areas such as mineral and natural resources. Steel Authority of India Limited, National Mineral Development Cooperation and Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited are the major Indian companies that engage in Afghanistan. Indian companies have made investments of nearly $25 million in Afghanistan since 2001. Services and construction are major areas of interest by Indian companies in Afghanistan. The India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement signed in October 2011 emphasizes reconstruction and development, economic engagement and trade and investment. Mining and hydrocarbons are viewed as major areas of cooperation between India and Afghanistan. Indian companies are interested in Afghanistan’s petroleum blocks and copper ore mines. Indian firms are granted the bids to mine four blocks of an estimated 2 billion tones of iron in Hajigak iron ore, which is the largest iron ore inside Afghanistan.

However, India’s economic engagement with Afghanistan is largely state-driven, while the Indian private sectors and companies are still far away from being interested in investing in Afghanistan. India is trying to make Indian entrepreneurs be aware of the business potential of Afghanistan by organizing various investment workshops and conferences, taking Indian businessmen to Afghanistan through business tours and promoting business-to-business contacts. For example, in 2013, in collaboration with the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Kabul Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industries (FICCI), India organized the India-Afghanistan Innovation Partnership Fair in Kabul to showcase innovations of industries from India and Afghanistan and facilitate trade between the two countries and different Indian companies.

Table 1: India’s Trade Volume with Afghanistan (2009-2014)

Source: Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry

For many Afghan students, India is one of the ideal destinations to study, given the cultural similarities between India and Afghanistan and the high quality of teaching of Indian universities. Since 2001, more than 10,000 Afghan students have studied in India with scholarships offered by Indian government and universities, while more than 8,000 are pursuing self-financed degrees in various universities and institutions across India.

II. Challenges to India’s Afghan Policy

As a major state in South Asia, India plays a significant role in Afghanistan. India closely monitored the political and security developments in Afghanistan because of its geopolitical importance. With international security assistance force led by US withdrawal in 2014 and the political transition of Afghan government, Afghanistan faces security and political challenges. On the political dimension inside Afghanistan, the new unity government led by both Dr. Ashraf Ghani as president and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah as chief executive officer after the two terms of the presidency of Hamid Karzai, shows possible vulnerability and divisions. Political uncertainty at the highest level of leadership may not only create governance crisis but also, given the complicated ethnic relationship, give rise to political split along the ethnic lines. The Afghan political system and institutions are divided along the rifts of both ethnic and religious line. Even today, no single Afghan political party operates with the pan-Afghan identity, while most of the parties are still mobilized based on ethnic and sectarian lines or in common opposition to another particular group, rather than being united along ideological lines or under national issue.

On the security dimension, the limited success on the battlefield achieved by international forces led by the US in Afghanistan during the past decade proved that US-led foreign military intervention cannot bring this country lasting peace and stability. The security situation in Afghanistan remains fragile: Afghanistan is still vulnerable to the Taliban and “Islamic State’s” expansion, government political instability, social poverty, ethnic complexity, and continued regional powers rivalries. Among all these uncertainties, the threat from the Taliban is the most serious. Despite decade-long counter-insurgency measures taken by both US-led international forces and Afghan security forces, the Taliban continue to exert its strong military influence, especially in southern Afghanistan; meanwhile, they have successfully spread their control over large areas across the country. In September of 2015 and 2016, Taliban even temporarily twice occupied part of the important strategically city of Kunduz in northern Afghanistan. The fall of Kunduz showed the increasing security threat of Taliban because Kunduz is the homeland of ethnic groups, such as Tajik, Hazaras and Uzbek that are not the traditional supporters of Taliban.

With the US withdrawal plan, it is questionable whether the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) has the capacity to secure national stability, even supported by continued international assistance. An independent assessment of the ANSF commissioned by the US Congress in January 2014 highlighted that “the ANSF will require international enabling assistance including advisors through at least 2018.” Given the fact that some Islamic extremist groups, such as Taliban, Al-Qaeda and the “Islamic State” have already started to create “independent kingdom” inside Afghanistan, especially in southern Afghanistan, India fears that the expansion of Islamic extremist groups in Afghanistan would not only further complicate the Kashmir issue, but would also boost Islamic extremism and terrorism inside India.

The new variable of uncertainty for Afghanistan stability is the expansion of Islamic State. The “Islamic State” affiliate in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Wilayat Khorasan, controls several areas in Afghanistan’s eastern Nangarhar Province and has successfully launched attacks on Jalalabad and Kabul. Taliban’s internal conflict was further intensified after Afghan government in July of 2015 announced the death of Mullah Omar, the spiritual leader of Taliban. Omar’s death has not only provoked the Taliban internal conflicts, but has also complicated the relations among different Afghan Islamic extremist groups.

These fragile and uncertain Afghan political and security environments actually facilitate the growth and development of Wilayat Khorasan, or the “Islamic State’s” branch in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Wilayat Khorasan’s growth in Afghanistan will not only give the “Islamic State” an additional strategic base outside of Iraq and Syria, but also will intensify the competition between the “Islamic State” and Al-Qaeda around the globe. Like the Taliban, the “Islamic State” has also successfully controlled several areas inside southeast Afghanistan. The organization has launched attacks in several other areas, such as Zabul and Laghman Province in Afghanistan, and Peshawar province in Pakistan. Wilayat Khorasan also expands its influence through its alliance with different regional extremist groups in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. For example, Wilayat Khorasan has established an alliance with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which operates in northern Afghanistan and in Zabul Province in eastern Afghanistan. Compared to the ANSF and Taliban, it is reported that Wilayat Khorasan can pay more salaries and better weapons to its members. With its expansion in Afghanistan, the “Islamic State” successfully plans and carries out its attacks in major cities of Afghanistan in order to gain further support from other Islamic extremist groups. The rising “Islamic State” branch in Afghanistan poses a strong threat to Afghan security and stability.

Extremism in Afghanistan also complicates India who also faces terrorism threats domestically. India has the world’s second largest Muslim population, and the Kashmir problem between India and Pakistan serves as a stimulating factor for Islamic extremist movements. Traditionally, Islamic extremists were trained mostly in Pakistan before they went back to India and planned terrorist attacks against the Indian government and military targets. However, after the 2011 “Arab Spring”, especially the rise of the “Islamic State” in Syria and Iraq, some Indian Muslim youth went to Iraq and Syria to join the “Islamic State” and received training there. In August 2015, India authority argued that it estimated that a total of 13 Indian nationals had joined the “Islamic State”, of whom six died in Iraq and Syria. These Indian youths are from several different states of India, but most are from Telangana, Maharashtra and Karnataka. Further evidence of Indian nationals in the “Islamic State” has come through social media outlets like Twitter and Facebook, either run by jihadist sympathizers or the group’s own media units.

III. Adjustments of India’s Afghan Policy

To address the security and political challenges in Afghanistan after 2014, from the security dimension, India further improves its security cooperation with regional and international states. On the one hand, India has established close military and intelligence relations with Afghanistan’s neighboring states, especially the Central Asian states that are troubled or even threatened by Islamic extremist groups. Many extremist groups in Central Asia, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), try to establish caliphate through overthrowing the governments. The Taliban, Al- Qaeda and the “Islamic State” have successfully set up their presence across Central Asia and Central Asian states, given their fragile political stability and poor military forces are not able to effectively monitor their border with Afghanistan. Against this backdrop, counter-terrorism measures and security and defense cooperation are important areas for India-Central Asian ties. India has provided training programs to different Central Asian states in the aim of strengthening military cooperation. Military training for the armed forces from the Central Asian states is primarily provided through the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program and officers from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan regularly attend courses in Indian National Defense College (NDC), Indian Military Academy (IMA) and National Defense Academy (NDA). Meanwhile, India and Central Asia security cooperation may increase with India’s full membership to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Working as an important regional platform of countering -terrorism and intelligence sharing, SCO may help India play a greater role in Afghanistan.

On the other hand, India also strengthens its military ties with Afghanistan through deepening the defense cooperation from training Afghan military personnel to intelligence-sharing and supplying military equipment to Afghan security forces. India’s concerns about terrorism emanating from the extremely volatile Pakistan-Afghanistan border spilling into its territory are real and imminent. A strong, stable and democratic Afghanistan would act as a bulwark to reduce the dangers of extremist violence and terrorism destabilizing the region. India-Afghanistan bilateral security relations have been enhanced particularly since April 2015, and the visit of Afghan National Security Adviser Hanif Atmar and Deputy Foreign Minister Hekmat Khalil Karzai’s to New Delhi in November 2015. During Atmar’s visit, Afghanistan convinced India to donate four Mi-25 attack helicopters. What should be noted is that this was the first time India delivered lethal weaponry to Afghanistan.

India also tries to maintain close political ties with Afghanistan although the new Afghan government led by Ghani tries to develop closer ties with Pakistan. President Ghani assumed power in December 2014 when the international forces led by the US were close to withdrawing. Newly created ANSF was still not able to serve as a replacement for the international forces to keep stability in Afghanistan. Against this backdrop, President Ghani believed that the only option for durable peace in Afghanistan was negotiations with the Taliban. However, with a wave of military attacks initiated and terrorism attacks planned by Taliban and other extremist groups inside Afghanistan. The intensive attacks in both southern and northern Afghanistan forced the Afghan government to rethink its policy toward the Taliban and Pakistan. As Ghani states: “We no longer expect Pakistan to bring the Taliban to the negotiation table, but we want Pakistan to respect the commitments it made in the quadrilateral meeting to fight against those Taliban identified to be living in Pakistan.”

After assuming the presidency in late 2014, Ghani tried to find a balance between India and Pakistan. from then, Ghani endeavored to maintain closer military ties with Pakistan. Ghani and Pakistan agreed over sending Afghan cadets for military training in Pakistan, allowing Pakistani intelligence officers to interrogate detainees in Afghan detention facilities, conducting military operations in Afghanistan at the request of Pakistan. Although the new Afghan government tried to distance itself from India, given that President Ghani’s first official trip to India only took place in April 2015, more than six months after his official visit China and Pakistan, the Indian government still warmly welcomed Ghani with a big gift. In June 2016, Indian Prime Minister Modi visited Afghanistan to showcase Indian support to the new Afghan government. During his visit to Afghanistan, Modi, together with President Ghani, declared the inauguration of a 290-million-dollars hydroelectric dam built with Indian aid in the Afghan city of Herat, the latest illustration of the strengthening ties between the two countries. India hopes to further the “friendship” with Afghanistan, according to Modi, “the fruits of our friendship are not confined to Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar and Herat. They will never be. Our cooperation will extend to every part of Afghanistan.”

Meanwhile, India is very cautious on deploying troops in Afghanistan. Although India believes that a strong, stable and democratic Afghanistan would act as a bulwark to reduce the dangers of extremist violence and terrorism destabilizing the region , India has purposefully limited its role in military engagement to training military personnel. India had long kept the principle of “zero presence” for military existence in Afghanistan and it only after 2005, when the Taliban killed an Indian diplomat, decided to send a mere 200 troops to Afghanistan. India is careful about providing arms directly to Kabul because it may provoke Pakistan and the insurgents in Afghanistan. India helped train military forces and officers in Afghanistan. Indian trained 1700 Afghan military personnel annually after 2001 in the training camp in India. In 2011, India promised to offer more equipment to Afghan military forces. A deal has been signed through which Afghanistan will buy arms from Russia and the payment will be made by India, but the weapons bought from Russia by India to Afghanistan are mainly non-lethal.

IV. Conclusion: Challenges and Future of India’s Afghanistan Policy

Traditionally, many analysts concluded Indian’s policy as “soft policy”. India’s “soft” policy toward Afghanistan positively have influenced India -Afghanistan ties since 2001 when the Taliban were ousted; as Indian Prime Minster Modi argued: “You know that India is here to lay the foundations of future, not light the flame of conflict; to rebuild lives, not destroy a nation”. However, due to persistent fighting, weak governance and massive corruption, Afghanistan is yet to recover from the destruction of wars and civil wars as anticipated by international society. The Afghan government needs to strengthen its military forces to safeguard different strategic locations from being attacked by both the Taliban and newly established “Islamic State” branch — Wilayat Khorasan. Although India makes efforts to safeguard its interests in Afghanistan through “soft power”, the political turbulence and security uncertainties still challenge India’s interests and policies in Afghanistan, given the fact that India lacks effective measures to protect its citizens in Afghanistan. For example, the Taliban from Afghanistan’s Herat province had abducted an Indian aid worker Alexis Prem Kumar. Although Kumar was released in 2015, India refrained from sending troops directly to Afghanistan; it tried to save Kumar out only through the efforts of Afghan security forces.

Second, the geographical separation between India and Afghanistan constrains India’s influence in Afghanistan. India tries to find a reliable “third state” to connect India and Afghanistan. When Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Iran to attend the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit in August 2012, a tripartite meeting was held between India, Iran and Afghanistan. In this tripartite meeting, a Joint Working Group was established with the aim to help boost trade and transit between India and Afghanistan through Iran’s port of Chabahar. The Chabahar port provides a shorter transportation distance between India and Afghanistan. The first consignment from Afghanistan to India via Chabahar port came to Mumbai in September 2013 with 20 containers of Afghan dry fruits. To upgrade the Chabahar port, India has pledged more than 100 million dollars for the constructions around the Chabahar port. Meanwhile, India has encouraged Indian companies to invest more in the Chabahar project. India also seeks help from Pakistan to connect with Afghanistan. In 2010 Pakistan and Afghanistan signed an agreement of Afghanistan -Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA), by which Pakistan permits Afghanistan to transports goods through Pakistan to India. However, the APTTA only permits the transportation of Afghan-India direction and does not allow India to export goods to Afghanistan via Pakistan territory.

Third, the India-Afghanistan relationship at the international level is largely constrained by the Pakistan factor. “India’s primary interest in Afghanistan is to prevent Afghanistan from being a ‘proxy’ of Pakistan.” As a state neighboring both Afghanistan from the north and India from the south, Pakistan’s geopolitical importance allows Pakistan to play a significant role in Afghan affairs. Pakistan’s military and diplomatic support for the Taliban helped the latter gain political power inside Afghanistan after the mid-1990s. When the US launched war against the Taliban in 2001, then US president Bush used both intimidation through force and with the promise of benefits to urge president Musharraf of Pakistan to join the international camp against the Taliban. The US provided nearly $26 billion to Pakistan from 2001 -2014. To this date, Pakistan still participates in the political negotiations between Afghan government and the Taliban organized by the US, and works as the important transfer station for the supplies of international forces to Afghanistan.

Fourth, Indian -Afghani ties in the future will be impacted by the possible political turmoil inside the Afghan government. There is still absence of political unity and pan-Afghan identity among different political parties and organizations; most of the parties or coalitions are based not on ideological line or national agreements/disagreements, but rather ethnic and sectarian lines. Meanwhile, the new unity government would be under immense pressure from both state-building process and corruption clearing internally, and the threat from extremism externally. The two leaders, President Ghani and Chief executive Officer Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, should overcome their rifts and consider how to promote cooperation between and coordination among different political factions to improve the efficiency and functioning of the government. This would not only require different groups and parties to put aside personal or inter-group differences and focus on cooperation, but would also require regional players, such as the US, Russia, China, India, Iran and Pakistan to work together. The unity and efficiency of the new government is crucial for both political and security transitions in Afghanistan.

The bilateral relationship between India and Afghanistan is set to grow stronger in the future. India’s positive role in post-Taliban Afghanistan and the withdrawal of US-led international forces led many to conclude that the Indian- Afghan alliance will be directed against Pakistan. At the same time, India’s policy toward Afghanistan also has been hotly debated given the vulnerabilities of both Afghan government and its military forces. Some believe that India should make more efforts to help Afghan military forces and the government to prevent the expansion of the Taliban ; some even maintain that Indian should be “more aggressive” on Afghan affairs and establish hegemony in South Asia through the competition with Pakistan on Afghanistan ; while still some others put forward that given the possible collapse of the Afghan government without the help from the US and other international forces, India should be prepared to withdraw from Afghanistan, or at least keep the “wait-and-see” strategy. All the debates and discussions about future Indian policy towards Afghanistan disclose the uncertainties and possible challenges faced by India-Afghanistan relationship in the future.

(王晋：海法大学政治学院博士生；西北大学叙利亚研究中心特约研究员)